MIT Center for Theoretical Physics – a Leinweber Institute

We present a framework for systematic computations of scattering amplitudes for gravitational Raman scattering, — the inelastic scattering of massless fields off compact relativistic objects. We focus on the small-frequency (post-Minkowskian, PM) regime relevant for the study of tidal effects, which can be mapped onto gravitational wave observables during the inspiraling phase of a merger. We demonstrate that this setup is ideal for systematic studies of tidal effects, in a way that is free from coordinate, gauge, and field redefinition ambiguities. We use a combination of worldline effective field theory, the background field method, and advanced scattering amplitude techniques to derive phase shifts for scattering of spin-$0,1,2$ fields off generic compact objects at third PM order. We demonstrate that the inclusion of the recoil of the object is crucial for consistency of this calculation. Focusing on a particular case of black holes, we extract the leading static and dynamical Love numbers of the spin-0 field and the static Love number of the spin-1 field in four dimensions by matching our EFT amplitudes and calculations in General Relativity. We show, fully on-shell, that the leading static Love numbers vanish identically, while the dynamical Love numbers are not zero and run logarithmically. The latter resolves the ambiguities of previous off-shell matching calculations. We also extend our results to seven dimensions, where spin-2 Love numbers undergo a renormalization group running at 2PM, which we compute explicitly. In addition, we extract the leading static Love numbers of spin-0 and spin-1 fields in five dimensions, which also run.

The one-state statement for closed universes has sparked considerable discussion. In this paper we examine its physical meaning in the context of the Hartle-Hawking state and de Sitter space. We argue that the one-state property of closed universes is fully compatible with the finite-dimensional quantum mechanics experienced by observers inside de Sitter space, and that this compatibility requires neither mixing of alpha sectors nor any modification of the rules of the gravitational path integral. The apparent tension is resolved by sharply distinguishing the baby-universe Hilbert space, namely the space of closed universes viewed from the outside, from the bulk Hilbert space that governs quantum mechanics for an observer inside a single de Sitter universe. The baby-universe Hilbert space, together with its commutative operator algebra, is not a quantum-mechanical Hilbert space: it is merely a mathematical repackaging of classical probability theory and does not carry any quantum-mechanical structure at all, a direct consequence of the one-state property of closed universes. Accordingly, attempting to formulate quantum mechanics directly on the baby-universe Hilbert space conflates classical ensemble data with the quantum mechanics experienced by bulk observers and leads to physically incorrect conclusions. By contrast, the quantum mechanics experienced by an observer inside de Sitter space emerges from the classical statistics encoded in the baby-universe Hilbert space, providing a concrete realization of Wheeler’s idea of “It from Bit”. We demonstrate these features by completely solving a topological toy model of one-dimensional de Sitter spacetime. Along the way we clarify the physical meaning of de Sitter entropy, showing that it corresponds to the coarse-grained entropy of the underlying state.

In this paper we extend recent ideas about observers and closed universes to theories where observers can be fluctuated into existence in the Hartle-Hawking state. This introduces a phenomenon that was not considered in these earlier discussions: the dominant transition from one cosmological state to another can go through a fluctuation that annihilates the universe and creates a new one. We nonetheless argue that the observer decoherence rule allows for the third-quantized description of such a theory to emerge from a factorizing holographic theory with a one-dimensional Hilbert space, without any need for $α$-parameters. We also point out a close analogy between the observer rule in this context and the coarse-graining of the spectral form factor at late times for AdS black holes. Along the way we clarify several aspects of the relationship between holography, the gravitational path integral, and $α$-parameters. We also explain why string theory scattering amplitudes do not lead to a one-dimensional Hilbert space on the worldsheet, despite being computed by a gravitational path integral with a sum over topology. Finally we point out that using the path integral to compute integrated local operators conditioned on an observer in the context of a theory with a landscape can lead to rather surprising conclusions. For example we argue that in a landscape with one AdS minimum and one dS minimum, both of which can support observers, an observer almost surely finds themself in dS and not AdS even if the boundary conditions are dual to a state with an observer in AdS.

[Abridged] Some cosmological theories propose that the observable universe is a small part of a much larger universe in which parameters describing the low-energy laws of physics vary from region to region. How can we reasonably assess a theory that describes such a mostly unobservable universe? We propose a Bayesian method based on theory-generated probability distributions for our observations. We focus on basic principles, leaving aside concerns about practicality. (We also leave aside the measure problem, to discuss other issues.) We argue that cosmological theories can be tested by standard Bayesian updating, but we need to use theoretical predictions for “first-person” probabilities — i.e., probabilities for our observations, accounting for all relevant selection effects. These selection effects can depend on the observer, and on time, so in principle first-person probabilities are defined for each observer-instant — an observer at an instant of time. First-person probabilities should take into account everything the observer believes about herself and her surroundings — i.e., her “subjective state”. We advocate a “Principle of Self-Locating Indifference” (PSLI), asserting that any real observer should make predictions as if she were chosen randomly from the theoretically predicted observer-instants that share her subjective state. We believe the PSLI is intuitively very reasonable, but also argue that it maximizes the expected fraction of observers who will make correct predictions. Cosmological theories will in general predict a set of possible universes, each with a probability. To calculate first-person probabilities, we argue that each possible universe should be weighted by the number of observer-instants in the specified subjective state that it contains. We also discuss Boltzmann brains, the humans/Jovians parable of Hartle and Srednicki, and the use of “old evidence”.